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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pablo Meraz Mendoza appeals from the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings 
The facts and course of proceedings relating to Mendoza's first post-
conviction action are as set forth by the district court in its order giving Mendoza 
notice of its intent to dismiss his successive petition for post-conviction relief: 
Following Petitioner's trial before a jury in the instant action, 
verdicts were returned on January 15, 1993, finding him guilty of 
four counts of trafficking in heroin and one count of conspiracy to 
deliver heroin. On March 5, 1993, a Judgment and Commitment 
entered, sentencing Petitioner to a term of life in prison with the first 
twenty years fixed for the offense of conspiracy to deliver heroin 
and a term of seven years with the first three years fixed for each of 
the counts of trafficking in heroin; each to run consecutively to the 
other, but concurrently with the sentence for conspiracy to deliver 
heroin. Petitioner appealed this judgment; however, the Supreme 
Court of Idaho dismissed that appeal and a Remittitur entered on 
March 4, 1994. Thereafter, Petitioner sought to reinstate his appeal 
which was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court in its Order Denying 
Motion to Reinstate Appeal dated October 6, 2000. Petitioner 
subsequently filed a motion titled Correction of Illegal Sentence 
(Rule 35) which the Court denied in its Order Denying Motion for 
Correction of Sentence entered on April 9, 2007. Petitioner 
appealed this decision; however, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the trial court in a decision filed on November 9, 2007, for 
which a Remittitur entered on February 4, 2008. On June 23, 2010, 
Petitioner filed his first post-conviction petition in Case No. CV-PC-
2010-12700, well past one year from the final remittitur by the Idaho 
Court of Appeals and more than sixteen years from the remittitur 
following the Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal of his 
Judgment of Conviction and Commitment, and therefore untimely. 
See I.C. § 19-4902(a). The Court entered its Order Denying Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel and Notice of Intent to Dismiss the 
Application for Post-Conviction Relief as to Petitioner's first petition 
on December 9, 2010. Having waited more than twenty days and 
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having received no response from Petitioner, the Court entered its 
Order dismissing Petitioner's first petition on January 10, 2011. 
(R., p.125.) 
Statement of Facts and Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings 
Mendoza filed a pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief in 
October of 2012. (R., pp.8-20.) In it, Mendoza raised several issues of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, including claims counsel was ineffective for 
failing to object to the admission of prejudicial statements, failing to 
object to the omission of certain jury instructions concerning a 
charge of conspiracy, and failing to present testimony of witnesses 
to impeach the testimony of the State's key witness. 
(R., p.125.) The state asserted all of Mendoza's claims were subject to summary 
dismissal because Mendoza had shown no basis for equitable tolling. (R., 
pp.122-123.) 
The district court filed an order giving Mendoza the statutory 20 days to 
respond to its notice of intent to dismiss his successive petition for post-
conviction relief as untimely. (R., pp.124-128.) Mendoza filed a response to the 
court's notice of its intent to dismiss, but failed to assert any basis for equitable 
tolling under Idaho law. (R., pp.129-133.) 
The district court then filed a memorandum decision and order dismissing 
Mendoza's successive petition for post-conviction relief: 
Petitioner in the case at bar has presented nothing in either his 
petition or his response tending to show that his circumstances fall 
within those situations where the equitable tolling doctrine would 
apply. Having failed to do so, the Court finds that the Successive 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief is untimely and there is no basis 
for tolling the applicable time limits. 
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(R., pp.134-135.) Mendoza timely appealed from the judgment dismissing his 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.137-142.) 
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ISSUE 
Mendoza states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Does an Idaho District Court acquire jurisdiction to engrave an exception 
for equitable tolling from Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), and its 
progeny if facts demonstrate one of the principles set forth by the high 
court? 
II. Do facts in a petition for post-conviction relief that demonstrate 
violations of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial raise the possibility of a 
valid claim for equitable tolling when affixed to a claim of innocence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.2.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Mendoza failed to establish that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
Mendoza Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
The district court dismissed Mendoza's successive petition, finding 
Mendoza failed to cite the court to any "facts which would raise the possibility of 
tolling the time limits for filing his post-conviction petition[.]" (R., p.134.) The 
district court further found the United States Supreme Court case relied on by 
Medoza was inapplicable as it governed federal habeas corpus claims and not "a 
petition in state court for post-conviction relief." (Id.) On appeal, Mendoza again 
fails to assert any basis under which he is entitled to equitable tolling under Idaho 
law but continues to assert federal law governing habeas corpus entitles him file 
his successive state petition for post-conviction relief almost 19 years following 
the filing of the remittitur following the dismissal of his original appeal. (See 
generally Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.) 
Mendoza's argument on appeal is without merit. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's 
application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State, 
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001). On appeal from summary 
dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to 
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the 
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v. 
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State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State, 
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely 
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, 
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Dismissal Of Mendoza's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Was Appropriate 
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil 
proceeding and the petitioner bears the burden of establishing, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). However, a petition for post-conviction 
relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain 
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a 
complaint. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P. 
8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and 
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations. ~ (citing I.C. § 19-
4903). Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application 
must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary 
hearing. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982); 
Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own 
initiative. 'To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
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present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises 
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims. 
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a 
petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept 
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, 
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing 
the petition. l!i (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting 
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." l!i 
Applying these principles in this case, the district court summarily 
dismissed Mendoza's petition as untimely. Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires 
that a post-conviction proceeding be commenced by filing a petition "any time 
within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the 
determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an 
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appeal, whichever is later." Absent a showing by the petitioner that the one-year 
statute of limitation should be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for post-
conviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 
Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 
778 (Ct. App. 2003). The only three circumstances in which Idaho recognizes 
equitable tolling are: (1) "where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state 
facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho 
legal materials," Sayas, 139 Idaho at 960, 88 P.3d at 779; (2) "where mental 
disease and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and 
prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction," kL and (3) 
where there are '"claims which simply [were] not known to the defendant within 
the time limit, yet raise important due process issues,"' Rhoades v. State, 148 
Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). Mendoza's petition did not allege 
any of the foregoing bases as a reason to toll the limitation period for filing his 
petition. (See generally Appellant's brief, pp.8-20.) 
Applying the above principles in this case, the district court summarily 
dismissed Mendoza's petition. Contrary to Mendoza's assertions on appeal, a 
review of the record and the applicable law supports the district court's order of 
summary dismissal. Mendoza's successive petition was filed October 4, 2012, 
almost 19 years following the 1994 filing of the remittitur following the dismissal 
of his original appeal. 
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Mendoza does not argue that his claims were not known to him or could 
not reasonably have been known to him in the requisite time-frame for filing his 
initial post-conviction petition. Instead, Mendoza claims he is entitled to the 
tolling of the time limit for filing set by state statute by virtue of a United States 
Supreme Court case addressing the filing of habeas corpus petitions. (See 
Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Court 
held that state procedural default of claims is binding in federal habeas corpus 
proceedings absent a showing of cause and prejudice, which must, at a 
minimum, rise to the level of being caused by factors external to the defense or 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mendoza does not cite any controlling state 
cases addressing the statute controlling actions pursued under the UPCPA or for 
his position that he is entitled to tolling of the time limit in which to file a 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. Mendoza further asserts trial 
counsel's mistakes at trial violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights 
"which caused the conviction of an innocent person and thus raise a valid claim 
for equitable tolling." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) However, Mendoza again fails to 
even allege a basis for the tolling of time pursuant to statute, let alone show 
cause why such claim was not known to him or could not reasonably have been 
known to him in the requisite time-frame for filing his initial post-conviction 
petition. 
Because Mendoza failed to justify the untimely filing of his petition, he has 
failed to show that the district court erred in dismissing his successive petition for 
post-conviction relief filed some 19 years after his original conviction. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order summarily dismissing Mendoza's successive petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of September, 2013, I caused 
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
PABLO MERAZ-MENDOZA 
INMATE NO. 38267 
ICC, Unit B-218-B 
PO Box 70010 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
NLS/pm 
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